Abstract: The primary motivation in this paper is to understand decision-making in design under competition from both prescriptive and descriptive perspectives. Engineering design is often carried out under competition from other designers or firms, where each competitor invests effort with the hope of getting a contract, attracting customers, or winning a prize. One such scenario of design under competition is crowdsourcing where designers compete for monetary prizes. Within existing literature, such competitive scenarios have been studied using models from contest theory, which are based on assumptions of rationality and equilibrium. Although these models are general enough for different types of contests, they do not address the unique characteristics of design decisionmaking, e.g., strategies related to the design process, the sequential nature of design decisions, the evolution of strategies, and heterogeneity among designers. In this paper, we address these gaps by developing an analytical model for design under competition, and using it in conjunction with a behavioral experiment to gain insights about how individuals actually make decisions in such scenarios. The contributions of the paper are two fold. First, a game-theoretic model is presented for sequential design decisions considering the decisions made by other players.
where f (e i ) is a non-negative increasing function denoting that as the effort increases, the probability of winning for that participant increases.
Commonly used functional forms of f (e i ) include the power form: f (e i ) = e m i with m > 0, and the exponential form:
f (e i ) = e ke i with k > 0. These two functional forms result in different contest success functions. The power form results in The latter formulation can be derived both axiomatically and stochastically [13, 15] .
These CSFs can be used to calculate the expected payoff in Eqn. (1) in terms of the players' strategies (e.g., effort).
At the Nash equilibrium [16] , each player chooses the strategy that is a best response to other players' strategies. Sha and co-authors [17] present rational reaction sets and Nash equilibria for simple contests with two players assuming different functional forms for the CSFs.
The structure of the basic contest models discussed above can be extended to more sophisticated contests, e.g., contests
with diverse cost and prize structures, nested contests, contests with alliances, and dynamic contests [18] . The formulation can be used to quantify the effects of different tournament design concepts on the equilibrium effort invested by the players in terms of exogenous parameters (e.g., prize amount), the endogenous parameters (e.g., expertise and effort), and the structure of the game (e.g., winner-takes-all vs. auction style).
Contest models have resulted in various insights, such as (i) restricted entry is better than free and open entry [19] ,
(ii) the optimal number of contestants is two [20] , (iii) the optimal strategy for maximizing effort from the contestants is to allocate the entire prize to a single winner, (iv) auction style contests reduce the sponsor's expenditure compared to fixed prize contests, and (v) the inefficiencies due to underinvestment of effort can be reduced by performance-contingent award [21] .
Empirical Studies on Contests
The results of game-theoretic models discussed in Section 2.1 are meaningful under the assumption of idealized rational behavior. In addition to the theoretical studies, few studies driven by empirical data and lab experiments have also been performed. Empirical studies have been used to validate some of the basic assumptions in theoretical models. For example, it has been established that contestants indeed have strategic behavior, i.e., the contestants' behaviors are based on the decisions of other contestants [22] . Such studies validate the use of game-theoretic framework for contests. 1 . incentive effects: increasing the number of players reduces individual effort, and 2. parallel path effects: increasing the number of players increases the possibility of finding an extreme value solution.
The authors show that one of these effects dominates based on the level of uncertainty in the problem. If the uncertainty is low, then the incentive effects dominate and the amount of effort reduces with increasing number of players. In contrast, if problem uncertainty is high, then the parallel path effects dominate, and the probability of finding an extreme solution increases. Sheremeta [25] performed lab experiments on different types of contests including a grand contest, contests with equal and unequal prizes, and a contest with multiple sub-contests. Based on the experiments, Sheremeta found that (a) the grand contest generates higher effort levels among all simultaneous contests, and (b) in multiple prize contests, equal prizes produce lower efforts than unequal prizes.
Recently, Sha et al. [17] synergistically utilized analytical models from contest theory and behavioral experiments to study design contests. The authors developed a function optimization game where the participants attempt to optimize a design characterized by a single parameter, whose performance is quantified by an unknown function. The players in the game can learn the performance of a design at a pre-specified cost. The behavioral experiment is used to understand how individuals make decisions in design crowdsourcing scenarios, and how their decisions deviate from the rationality assumption. Using the experimental data, the authors validate hypotheses derived from the analytical models, including "increasing the cost reduces the expected effort", "quality monotonically increases with the effort", and "increasing the effort increases the probability of winning". The authors also observe deviations from rationality, which can be attributed to the anchoring bias [26] .
Research Gaps and the Focus in this Paper
The contest theory models discussed in Section 2.1 are based on a number of assumptions, specifically (i) there is only one decision made by each player within a contest, (ii) a player's strategy only consists of effort, e i , (iii) the game is static, (iv) individuals operate at the Nash equilibrium, and (v) players are homogeneous. Although these models are general enough for different types of contests, and can provide insights into certain design activities, they do not address the unique characteristics of design-related decisions described in Section 1.
First, the models do not account for strategies related to the design process, e.g., search strategies, information acquisition strategies, and strategies to stop acquiring information before making an artifact decision. Second, the models do not account for the sequential nature of design decisions, e.g., information acquisition decisions are followed by artifact decisions, which are further followed by information acquisition decisions, and so on. Designers need to make decisions by considering the impact on future decisions. Third, current models do not consider evolution of strategies, e.g., they do not account for how people change their strategies as they gather more information. Fourth, the assumption of Nash equilibrium can be attributed to many factors such as iterated reasoning, mutual rationality, and learning over time [12, p. 23 of groups of individuals. The models do not address the heterogeneity among people, and the uniqueness of each player. This is a significant limitation because behavioral experiments have shown that there is significant variation among subjects and their strategies. These research gaps limit the application of contest theory models to design decisions under competition. To address these research gaps, we specifically focus on the following aspects: design-specific strategies, evolution of strategies, mutual rationality, learning over periods, and heterogeneity.
Research Framework
Different research approaches including field studies, empirical analysis of secondary data, and controlled experiments can be used for understanding the strategies adopted by different individuals in design problems. Field studies involve analyzing professional designers working on real design problems, and secondary data are those collected for purposes other than analysis. Using the former approach is challenging due to the presence of many uncontrollable variables that influence designers' decisions, while the latter is limited due to the lack of access to designers' private information. Controlled experiments allow greater control of the parameters that are not the focus of the study, and the information available to each designer is clear.
Ideally, the goal is to conduct experiments that simulate reality as closely as possible, while completely controlling for the variables of interest. However, these are conflicting goals. The design of experiments requires a tradeoff between realism and control. There are multiple types of experiments with different levels of control, as shown in Figure 1 . On the far left, there are laboratory experiments, which provide the highest level of control. Here, subjects participate in tasks that are well controlled to study the effects of treatment variables. On the far right are naturally occurring data, obtained from real-world designers in their regular activities. Between these two extremes, there are field experiments that provide a balance between control and realism [27, 28] . Field experiments can be further classified into three types, based on the aspects that are controlled. Clearly, the type of the experiment should be chosen based on the researcher's objective. The choice of the experiments has implications on the validity, ease of replication, and the ability to analyze the cause-and-effect relationships. Laboratory experiments have the highest internal validity, whereas natural data provide the highest ecological validity which is the degree to which an investigation represents real-life situations. In this study, our objective was to achieve high level of control in order to understand designers' strategies. Hence, we use lab experiments. Future studies will be focused on increasing the ecological validity through field experiments.
Using Games for Engineering Design Research
One approach to conducting lab experiments to study design-related decision making is using simple games that represent abstractions of specific activities within the design process. An example of such games is the parameter design game, MD-17-1215 -Page 6-Corresponding author: Jitesh H. Panchal initially developed by Hirschi and Frey [29] . In the game, there are two sets of parameters, inputs (x) and outputs (y), related through a linear mapping (y = Mx). The participants adjust the input variables to bring the values of each output variable y ∈ y within acceptable ranges ([y * − ε, y * + ε]). The game has been used to study the effects of (i) problem scale and coupling among parameters on the time for completion of tasks by humans [29] , (ii) technical and social complexity on design effort [30] , and (iii) scale and coupling on solution quality [31] . While the task appears much simpler than a real design problem, it is valuable from the standpoint of the human-subject experiment. The advantage of using such simplified domain independent problems within games is that they prevent confounding with subjects' domain specific knowledge. Further, Grogan and de Weck argue that "in this context-free case, even linear systems are not perceived as simple due to limited cognitive abilities without quantitative aids" [30] .
The use of such games is increasingly gaining attention within the engineering design and systems engineering literature.
Recent examples of games used for experiments include a truss design game [32] , a 3D peekaboo game [33] , an EcoRacer game [34] , and Orbital Federates game [35] . McComb et al. [32] use the truss design game to understand how humans sequence design operations. Ren et al. [34] use the EcoRacer game to compare the effectiveness of humans and optimization algorithms for computationally hard problems. While their study is framed as a crowdsourcing game, competition is only used to attract participants. They do not analyze the competitive scenario and its effects on individual decisions, which is the focus of this paper.
Function Optimization Game
In this study, we use the function optimization game developed by Sha et al. [17] . The choice of this game is driven by the need for a problem that is general enough to provide insights about broad classes of decision making situations in design, but at the same time has the specific features discussed in Section 1. In this game, each participant competes with another randomly selected participant in finding the optimum of an undisclosed function, f (x). The participants can learn about the value of the function for specific inputs at a pre-specified cost, c. At the end of the game, the participant who achieves the better output wins the contest, and receives a fixed prize (Π).
As Sha and co-authors [17] note, this game is a simple surrogate for decisions made in design under competition. The game embodies the following characteristics similar to design decision making scenarios: (i) a designer's goal is to find the best design [36] , (ii) designers need to evaluate the performance of design alternatives through computational or physical experiments, (iii) experiments incur costs, and (iv) greater number of experiments result in better understanding of the design space, therefore, better quality. In addition to being a simplified representation of decisions commonly encountered within the design process, the game also embodies the sequential information acquisition decisions, and enables the study of strategic decisions. There are advantages of using such a simple abstraction. It allows researchers to control for the influence of domain specific knowledge on participants' strategies. Due to its domain independence, it does not require specific knowledge or expertise, and can be executed with student subjects. The simple game also enables detailed analytical modeling. Therefore, the function optimization game enables controlled lab experiments.
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Participants' Decisions
The analytical model used by Sha and co-authors [17] is the standard model from contest theory, where the decision makers only make a single decision involving one strategic variable-the amount of effort (e i ). The quality is assumed to be an explicit function of the effort (e.g., q i = αe i or q i = α exp(βe i )). This allows for explicit derivation of Nash equilibrium under special cases. Using the simple model, Sha and co-authors [17] test hypotheses about the effect of cost on the number of tries, the effect of number of tries on the solution quality, and the effect of number of tries on the winning probability.
The simple model restricts the analysis of individual strategies for information acquisition, the evolution of strategies, how individuals account for their competitors' decisions, and the heterogeneity among the strategies of the individuals, which is the focus of this paper.
In contrast to the standard contest theory model, in this paper we assume that individuals make decisions sequentially.
At each step, t, the participants make two decisions. The first decision is whether to continue with an additional information acquisiton step (i.e., sampling more points) or not. This decision depends on three factors: the current quality of the design (i.e., the best function value achieved so far), the expected improvement in the quality if additional information is acquired, and the final quality of the competitor's design (which is not known). Gathering additional information may result in improvement in the solution quality, which increases the probability of winning, thereby increasing the expected value of gross payoff (ΠP i ). However, this additional information comes at a cost, c. Conceptually, if the expected improvement in the payoff is less than the cost, i.e., (Π∆P i < c), then the decision maker should stop further sampling. Since the probability of winning (P i ) is also dependent on the decisions made by the other player, this is a strategic decision, and it is best modeled as a game.
If the decision to acquire more information has been made, then the second decision is to choose the value of design variable x that is most likely to result in the optimum value of the function. This is an individual decision because it is not affected by the decisions made by the other player. Assuming that the decision makers are rational, they should pick the value of x that maximizes the net payoff. The net payoff is maximized by maximizing the probability of winning, which in turn is maximized by choosing the value of x that results in the maximum improvement in the quality of the solution. 
Experimental Setup
The experiment was carried out with 44 senior undergraduate Mechanical Engineering students at Purdue University.
The subjects competed in randomly assigned pairs to simulate two-player games. Each subject participated in two treatments:
low cost treatment (c = 10 tokens) and high cost treatment (c = 20 tokens). Within each treatment, there were 15 periods and the subjects played the game once in each period. Therefore, the subjects played the game 15 times in low cost treatment and 15 times in high cost treatment. Within a period, the subjects made the two decisions (decision to choose x, and decision to stop or not) sequentially multiple times. Each step of choosing x is referred to as a try.
At the end of each period, the winners receive the prize amount (Π = 200 tokens) minus their cost in that session.
At the start of each period, subjects are re-matched. They are never informed about whom they are competing against.
At the end of each period, participants are informed whether they won or not, the solution (x and f (x)) obtained by the winner, and the actual optimum of the function in that period. This provides feedback to the players about the opponent's solution when he/she does not win. This feedback does not directly reveal the solution or the opponent's strategy in the future periods because the function is randomly generated and participants are randomly matched in each period. However, it allows the players to form beliefs about the opponent's solution quality in the subsequent periods. In addition to controlling for the influence of participants' domain knowledge, the experiment is designed (and executed) to control for a number of other factors, including order effects, learning effects, and wealth effects. The experiment was implemented in z-Tree [37] .
Additional details of the game can be found in Ref. [17] .
The Proposed Normative Model
While there are many search strategies for design optimization, a promising approach that accounts for sequential decision making using unknown functional form is to model the function as a stochastic process. Such an approach is widely used in Bayesian global optimization [38] . From a cognitive standpoint, the approach is based on the assumption that individuals build an abstract model of the function based on the available information, but there is also uncertainty around the model. Different stochastic processes can be used for modeling the unknown function. Our model is based on the Wiener process model because of its computational simplicity in calculating the distribution of random variables after each observation [39] . Another advantage is that the approach can be extended in the future by considering more general random processes (e.g., Gaussian Processes), and can be extended to design problems in multiple dimensions. Finally, as we illustrate in the rest of the paper, the model provides a connection between prescriptive and descriptive models for 
Modeling the Function as a Wiener process
In this model, the function is assumed to be embedded in a family of curves generated by a random process. Given two points x j−1 and x j , and the corresponding function values f j−1 and f j , the function value f (x) for x ∈ [x j−1 , x j ] is modeled as a random variable. If f (x) is modeled as a Wiener process with parameter σ, the distribution of f (x) is normal with mean (µ) and variance (v), conditioned on the information z t is:
Here, z t is the set of all the data points (x, f (x)) obtained until time-step t. Note that the mean is linear between the two points and the variance is zero at the end points. It is assumed that f (x) for x ∈ [x j−1 , x j ] depends only on the two points, and the parameter σ. It does not depend on any other points outside the range. Further details are given in [39, 40] . The use of this model for an unknown function of single variable is illustrated in Figure 3 . Assume that the function to be minimized is known at two points, f (0) = 1, and f (1) = 0. In the top part of the figure, the mean µ(x), evaluated using Eqn. 4 is shown using the solid black line, and the dotted blue lines represent (µ(x) ± v(x; σ)) where v(x; σ) is evaluated using Eqn. 5 .
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Decision: Choosing the Next Point based on Expected Improvement
The choice of the next point is an individual decision. If a participant has decided not to stop sampling, the decision on where to sample does not depend on the decisions made by the competitor. Ideally, the overall sampling strategy should be based on the goal of minimizing the function at the lowest cost possible. Since the sampling decisions are made sequentially, each sampling decision should be made considering the impact on the subsequent sampling decisions. Dynamic programming approaches are generally recommended within decision theory for making such sequential decisions. However, due to the associated complexity, we do not consider such dynamic programming approaches. Instead, we consider a myopic strategy where individuals only consider one step ahead. Individuals are assumed to try to maximize their payoff by only considering one additional data point. The one-step ahead strategy is easier to use, and is one of the most commonly used strategy within the global optimization literature. Multiple criteria have been developed in the literature for selecting the next point. These include expected improvement, probability of improvement, value of information, and knowledge gradient [41] .
We assume that at each step, individuals try to maximize the expected improvement in the solution, because that corresponds to the maximization of the expected payoff. Assuming that a player has decided to invest in one more try, the expected payoff (see Eqn. 1) is maximized by maximizing the probability of winning (P i ), which can be achieved by maximizing the improvement.
The expected improvement for a function minimization problem is calculated as follows. The solution quality at try t, denoted by q t , is related to the improvement possible in the current best value f * t . If x is the point to be chosen at the next try, (t + 1), then the possible improvement, I t , is given by the following random variable:
The Expected Improvement (gain), G at t is
where F x is the normal distribution with mean µ(x) and variance v(x; σ). The expected gain can also be written as:
where,
Here, φ is the standard normal distribution, and ϕ is its density.
Assuming that the decision maker chooses x that maximizes the expected improvement as the decision criterion, the next point to be chosen is
In Figure 3 (bottom), the expected gain for x = [0 1], evaluated using Eqn. 9, is plotted. The expected gain is maximum at x = 0.84. The probability distribution of f * t+1 at x = 0.84, evaluated using Eqn. 17, is shown in red in the top part of the figure.
Decision: Whether to Stop Information Acquisition or Not
Consider a simpler case where there is no competition, and the payoff is proportional to the quality of the solution, i.e.,
(α f * ), with a constant α, then an individual using the one single step ahead strategy should stop if the expected gain in the net payoff is less than zero. Alternativey, the individual should stop if the expected gain in the gross payoff is less than the (deterministic) cost of gathering information at the additional data point. Mathematically,
i.e.,
This is the commonly used stopping criterion in the optimization literature. However, this does not account for the decisions made by other players. We extend this criterion to account for the competition, specifically for a two-player game.
Stopping Criterion for a Two-player Game
In terms of the net payoffs of each player, π i , a player i should stop if the expected improvement in the net payoff from t to (t + 1) is less than zero, i.e.,
Here, the payoff of player i at time step t is
where P i,t is the probability of player i winning after t tries; C i,t is the cost incurred by player i until t; f * −i is the best solution submitted by the other player. Note that f * i,t is known to player i after t tries. If player i continues for one more step, the net payoff is:
where C i,t+1 = C i,t + c. Note that f * i,t+1 is a random variable.
Substituting Eqns. (22) and (23) in Eqn. (20), we get the stopping criterion for player i as: . For brevity, we denote it as f * −i , and determine player i's stopping strategy in terms of f * −i . Therefore, for a given f * −i , since f * i,t is precisely known to player i,
On the other hand, based on Eqn. (17)
The first case can be split into two sub-cases, depending on whether f * i,t > f (x i,t+1 ) or not:
Here, f (x i,t+1 ) is a Gaussian distribution with mean µ(x i,t+1 |z i,t ) and variance v(x i,t+1 ; σ|z i,t ). Therefore,
Substituting Eqns. (28) and (32) in Eqn. (25), we get the stopping criterion as
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Intuitively, the first condition refers to the case where the current solution is not as good as the other player, but the expected improvement in the solution is higher than the cost for an additional try. The second condition refers to the scenario where the current solution is better than the best final solution of the other player, due to which the player i should stop. Using these conditions, player i can determine whether to stop or to continue, given the solution quality of the other player. This is the best response stopping criterion for the players.
Utility of the Model for Design Research and Practice
The model is an idealized mathematical representation of rational decision makers participating in a contest. It has three main uses in design research and practice. First, from the standpoint of design research, the model can be used as a baseline normative model for experimental studies on design decision making. In conjunction with human subject experiments, the model can be used to identify decision makers' strategies and their beliefs about the opponents' solution quality. That is how the model is used in the rest of this paper. From the standpoint of design practice, the second use of the model is that it can help participants in design contests (such as crowdsourcing contests) in making rational decisions about what information to acquire, and when to stop acquiring information considering their beliefs about the outcomes of the other participants. Third, the model can help contest designers in estimating the outcomes of a contest, and in making decisions about a contest such as the prize amount.
To evaluate the utility of the model in practical design scenarios, let us consider the core ingredients of the model:
(i) representing the unknown function as a random process,
(ii) the choice of the next point in the design space, and (iii) the best response stopping strategy.
In general, these three ingredients are applicable to all design scenarios where the solution quality is only dependent on the cost incurred during the design process (i.e., cost of computational and physical experiments). This is true in crowdsourcing challenges where the problem is well defined and the knowledge needed for solving the problem is widely available.
Examples of this are the airline bearing bracket challenge [42] and GE jet engine bracket challenge [43] on GrabCAD. Other examples in the software development domain are development challenges and data science challenges on Topcoder [24].
For such scenarios, these three ingredients help in addressing the limitations of existing game-theoretic models discussed in rion, which is well accepted in engineering design, but can be further refined by considering multiple-step-ahead strategies.
Finally, the best response strategy is derived for a two-person game. It can be extended to n > 2 players by replacing the final solution of the opponent f * −i with the best solution from all the n players.
In summary, this model is an idealization of general design-under-competition scenarios. It can be refined and particularized for specific design scenarios by accounting for the characteristics of design problems, the participants, and the information available to the participants. However, this particularization is out of scope of this paper. In the rest of the paper,
we focus on the first use of the model -understanding how humans make these decisions under competition.
Results from the Behavioral Experiments
In this section, we use the analytical model in conjunction with the data collected from the experiment described in Section 3. 4 . The focus is on gaining insights about the five areas that existing contest models fail to address (see Section 2.3):
design-specific strategies, evolution of strategies, mutual rationality, learning over periods, and heterogeneity. We assume that individuals make decisions using the model described in Section 4. Specifically, it is assumed that 1. individuals model the function as a Wiener process, with mean and variance given by Eqns. (4) and (5), 2. individuals use the expected improvement maximization criterion in Eqn. (14) for selecting the next point, and
individuals stop when the expected improvement in their net payoff (π i ) is negative, resulting in the stopping criterion of Eqn. (33).
The discussion of results is divided into two sections based on the two decisions: choosing the next point, and stopping. The overall approach for analysis of results is as follows. The data about individual decisions are used to estimate two parameters in this model: σ and f * −i . Parameter σ is estimated based on individual decisions on the next point, whereas f * −i is estimated based on the decision to stop further information acquisition. Unless specified, the level of significance used in this paper is α = 0.1.
Decisions on Which Next Point to Choose

Strategies
The parameter σ in the model quantifies a decision maker's uncertainty about the function between two known data points. The amount of uncertainty has an impact on the decision about the next point (x t+1 ). Before analyzing the experimental data, let us consider the impact of uncertainty on the search strategy. The effect of σ on the choice of the next point
for the illustrative example used in Figure 3 is calculated using Eqn. 14, and plotted in Figure 4 . If uncertainty about the function is low (i.e., low σ), then expected improvement maximization using Eqn. (14) results in the next point (x t+1 ) that is closer to the current best solution x * t = argmin x { f j−1 , f j }. This corresponds to the exploitation strategy commonly adopted in approaches for local search. As σ increases, x t+1 moves away from the current best solution, towards the inferior solution.
At the extreme, σ → ∞, the next point x t+1 converges to the mid pointx j = x j−1 + x j 2 . This corresponds to the exploration strategy commonly adopted in bisection approaches. Note that for σ ≥ 0, the next point x t+1 is always between the mid point { f j−1 , f j }, and the probability distribution is plotted in Figure 5 . Additionally, using the actual decisions made by the individuals about the next point (x t+1 ), we calculate the σ that solves Eqn. (14) for each try. This results in a dataset of σ values. The probability distribution of σ is plotted in Figure 6 , with the dashed line corresponding to an exponential distribution. Through the statistical analysis of the σ dataset, the following observations are made. First, it is observed in Figure 5 that with 91.77% probability, the normalized x t+1 values lie between [0.0, 0.5], which corresponds to the range between x * t andx j . This indicates that most of the decisions about x t+1 are consistent with the overall Wiener process model. This provides confidence about the appropriateness of the model. The rest (8.23%) of the points, corresponding to normalized x t+1 > 0.5 are ignored because they are inconsistent with the model. According to the model, these points would result in a negative value of expected improvement, and hence, would never be chosen because it would be against the expected payoff maximization principle.
Second, the σ values are found to be exponentially distributed (see Figure 6 ) with parameter λ = 0.045. Using this distribution, we estimate that 15% of the σ values are below 3.61 , which correspond to the strategy of exploitation, and about 15% are above 42.15 , corresponding to the exploration strategy. This indicates that the participants use both exploration and exploitation strategies in their decision making.
Analysis of Strategies using Linear Mixed Effects Regression
We analyze the effects of different variables on the strategy. Participants differ in how different factors affect their strategies. To analyze these differences, we use a linear mixed effects regression model [44] . As in general linear models, the dependent variable is formalized by a set of independent variables, as well as the error term. In the linear mixed effects model, the coefficients (effects) of such explanatory variables are not constant. Instead, a specific type of distribution is assumed for quantification of the heterogeneity among subjects. The general form of the model in matrix notation is:
where y is a N × 1 column vector, the outcome variable; X is a N × p matrix of the p explanatory variables; β is a p × 1 column vector of the fixed effects regression coefficients; Z is the N × q design matrix for q variables assumed to have random effects; γ is a q × 1 vector of the random effects; and ε is a N × 1 column vector of the residuals. ε is assumed to be multivariate normally distributed.
The fixed effect coefficient β is directly estimated as a column vector. The random effects γ ∼ N(0, G),where G is the covariance matrix of the random effects. The random effects are modeled as deviations from the fixed effect, and the variance in G is estimated. The estimated mean and the corresponding t-statistic of β, and the standard deviation of the random effect γ are listed in Table 1 and discussed in Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4.
Evolution of Search Strategies with Tries and Periods
It is observed that as the number of tries increases, the median of σ decreases, along with the interquartile range (IQR), as shown in Figure 7 . This indicates that as individuals acquire more information about the function, they shift their strategy from exploration to exploitation. This is also quantified by the negative value (−3.01) of the associated parameter in the fixed effect of the model shown in Table 1 . In the random effects, the standard deviation corresponding to the tries (t) is 17.72 .
This can be interpreted as follows. For some people, as t increases, σ decreases; but for others, increase in t corresponds to increase in σ, which indicates some heterogeneity in the participants' strategies. Specifically 
Effect of Cost on Strategies
As discussed in Section 3.4, the experiments were carried out for two cost settings: low cost (ID = 0), and high cost (ID = 1). The low cost setting is used as the reference level in the regression model. The effects of cost on σ are shown in a box plot in Figure 8 . On average, σ is higher in the high cost setting than in the low cost setting. From the low cost to high cost setting, the mean of σ increases from 13.45 
Decisions on Whether to Stop
Within game theory, the solution of a game is generally defined by placing a number of assumptions on the players' knowledge, and their assumptions about the other players' knowledge. For example, Nash equilibrium is defined by assuming common knowledge, rationality of participants, infinite computation capability, and mutual consistency [12] . Such assumptions are also made within contest models described in Section 2.1 where player i assumes that the other player, −i, will play the best response to the strategy (i.e., effort) played by player i. In the equilibrium stopping criterion presented in 
The mid point of the range is denoted by:
Throughf * −i , we analyze the players' assumptions about the quality of the opponents' solution.
It is observed that over 97.5% of thef * −i values are less than 0. This indicates that in most periods, the participants' assumed solution quality of their opponents at stopping is at least as good, or better, than the real optimum (i.e., f * −i ≤ f opt ).
To gain a better understanding of the distribution, we plot the cumulative distribution of −f * −i in order to fit an exponential distribution, as shown in Figure 9 . The values around 0 have the most frequency. Specifically, for about 20% of the values, the distance between the assumed optimum and the real optimum is 1.0. The median distance is 17. 46 Period: As period increases, the median off * −i gets closer to 0. This means that participants' assumption about the opponent's best values converges to the real optimum. This shows that learning plays an important role in affecting people's judgment on their opponent's performance. During the first few periods, most of the values off * −i are significantly less than 0, indicating that during those periods, participants are still trying to understand the game. As the period increases, people become more familiar with the game. The effect of period is quantified using the regression model. The fixed effect value of parameter for period is 3.0 with a t-statistic of 4.49 indicating the significance of this effect, whereas the standard deviation in the random effects is 2.21, indicating that the variation among participants is small. Table 2 , it is observed that the fixed effect of cost onf * −i is not significant since the t-statistic for cost is large standard deviation in the random effects (= 44.21) , which indicates that the effect of cost is different for different people. A potential explanation for the differences in the effect of cost is the payoff function assumed in the normative model. It is assumed that each player maximizes the expected prize (see Eqn. 22 ). This payoff function does not account for risk attitudes, which may be different for different participants. The payoff also does not account for the behavioral characteristics of human beings, such as different attitudes to gains and losses. These attitudes towards risk can be accounted by changing the payoff functions to utility functions and allowing for differences among different participants.
6 Closing Comments
Contributions
From the standpoint of design research, this is a step in using game theory in understanding design scenarios. Specifically, this is a step towards understanding how sequential information acquisition decisions for design under competition should be made (normative aspect), and how they are actually made by individuals (descriptive aspect). To address the normative aspect, we present a mathematical model based on the concepts from global optimization, and extend it to the case of design competition. The model is used in conjunction with the data generated from the behavioral experiment to gain insights about the descriptive aspect. In addition to the contributions to theoretical analysis of design under competition, one of the primary contributions of the paper is a systematic approach for analyzing the experimental data with the model to learn about participants' decision making strategies and what they believe about their opponent's solution quality.
Some of the key observations about individual strategies are as follows: (i) individuals shift their strategy from exploration to exploitation as they acquire more information about the function, (ii) heterogeneity exists in the effects of different parameters on strategies, (iii) most participants tend towards greater exploration as cost increases, (iv) individuals' search strategies for information acquisition is consistent across periods, and (v) the participants' assumed solution of their opponents at stopping is at least as good as the real optimum, in most cases. These insights cannot be gained by using existing models from contest theory, which focus on the aggregate population-level parameters. These insights can have implications for designing crowdsourcing contests. For example, if the contest designer's goal is to encourage exploration of the design space (e.g., to better understand the potential solutions and to generate diverse solutions), our experimental results indicate that the cost of information acquisition should be high and information provided about the solution space should be low.
Similarly, due to the learning effects, individuals' beliefs about competitors converge to those generally assumed in game theory (such as at the Nash equilibrium) as they play the game multiple times. Hence, repetition is helpful in achieving behavior that is closer to that predicted by analytical models.
Limitations
While the simplicity of the game helps in experimentation, it also comes with limitations in extending results to real design scenarios. First, this paper only addresses decision-making activities in design. It does not capture other activities in the design process, such as understanding customer requirements, idea generation, problem partitioning, and concept refinement. It is well established within the design literature that decision making does not capture all the tasks that a MD-17-1215 -Page 22-Corresponding author: Jitesh H. Panchal designer performs [48] . Second, the game presented in this paper is based on a parametric design problem. Therefore, it does not account for non-parametric design problems, particularly those in the early stages of design. Third, the game only accounts for monetary rewards. However, humans are not only driven by extrinsic monetary rewards but also by intrinsic motivations such as inherent satisfaction in completing a task, recognition, and obligation to the community [50] . Fourth, the study is focused on individual decision making only. It does not account for group decision making or team dynamics. Fifth, the extensibility of analysis results is limited by the assumptions in the model (e.g., Wiener process with specified mean and variance, pre-defined information acquisition criterion, myopic stopping criterion, etc.). Finally, as discussed in Section 4.4, the proposed model is only applicable for crowdsourcing scenarios where the solution quality is only dependent on effort (cost of design). Since all players are assumed to be similar in expertise, knowledge and past experience, the proposed model is not suitable to model crowdsourcing scenarios where the goal is to get diverse solutions in response to a set of requirements.
Some of these limitations are attributed to the specific design of the experiment, and can be addressed in future research.
For example, the game can be extended to other forms of contests, and particularized to specific design problems by replacing f (x) with physics-based models. Future research opportunities include consideration of expertise and design-specific knowledge, team formation, and application to more realistic design problems. On the other hand, some of these limitations are due to the inherent nature of laboratory experimentation. To gain a holistic understanding of decision making in design, the results from this experiment can be used in conjunction with field experiments and naturally occurring data.
